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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Patrick Earl Suttle appeals from the district court's order denying his I.C.R.
35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2009, following an argument, Suttle struck Michelle Ahmuty, his
girlfriend, in her face and head. (#40689 1 PSI, pp.1, 95-96, 102-103.)
also burned Ahumty's arm with a lit cigarette.

(Id.)

Suttle

Suttle then attempted to

strangle Ahmuty with his hands. (#40689 PSI, pp.1, 95.) Following the attack,
Suttle held Ahmuty in her residence against her will for several hours. (#40689
PSI, pp.1, 95-96.) Before Suttle finally left the residence, he stole Ahmuty's cell
phone and told her that his friends would harm her if she "had him arrested."
(#40689 PSI, pp.1, 95-96, 102-103.) Responding officers obseNed that Ahmuty
had a swollen face, a bruise forming under her left eye, marks on her neck, and a
cigarette burn on her arm. (Id.)
The state charged Suttle with attempted strangulation, intimidation of a
witness, false imprisonment, two counts of misdemeanor battery, and petit theft.
(#40689 R., pp.33-35.)

Pursuant to plea agreement, Suttle pied guilty to

attempted strangulation and one count of misdemeanor battery.

(#40689 R.,

pp.64-68.)

(#40689 R.,

The state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges.

The Idaho Supreme Court took judicial notice of the clerk's record, reporter's
transcripts, and exhibits (including confidential exhibits), associated with Suttle's
direct appeal from the underlying conviction, Docket No. 40689. (8/7/14 Order.)
Citations to the PSI from Docket No. 40689 are to the electronic file "SuttlePSI."
1
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p.42.) The district court imposed a unified 10-year sentence with three years
fixed for attempted strangulation, but suspended the sentence and placed Suttle
on probation for 10 years. (#40689 R., pp.64-68.) The district court imposed a
concurrent jail sentence for misdemeanor battery. (Id.) In 2013, after multiple
probation violations, the district court revoked Suttle's probation and ordered the
original sentence executed.

(#40689 R., pp.151-153.)

The Idaho Court of

Appeals affirmed the district court's revocation of probation and imposition of
sentence. State v. Suttle, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 806, Docket No. 40689
(Idaho App., December 31, 2013).
In 2015, Suttle filed a pro se l.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal
sentence. (R., pp.27-30.) Suttle, citing State v Moffat, 154 Idaho 529, 300 P.3d
61 (2013), asserted that the district court violated his double jeopardy rights by
punishing him twice for a single offense.

(Id.)

The district court denied the

motion, concluding: (1) Suttle failed to demonstrate a double jeopardy violation
from the face of the record; and (2) l.C.R. 35(a) did not permit it to "revisit the
factual basis underlying the offense" to determine whether Suttle was punished
twice for the same conduct. (R., pp.31-36.) Suttle timely appealed. (R., pp.4548.)
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ISSUE
Suttle states the issue on appeal as:
Whether Mr. Suttle's convictions and sentences for
attempted strangulation and misdemeanor battery are illegal
because they violate constitutional prohibitions against
double jeopardy?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Suttle failed to show that the district court erred in denying his I.C.R.
35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence?
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ARGUMENT
Suttle Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His I.C.R.
35(a) Motion To Correct An Illegal Sentence
Introduction

A.

Suttle contends that the district court erred by denying his I.C.R. 35(a)
motion to correct an illegal sentence.

(See generally Appellant's brief.)

Specifically, Suttle contends that his sentences and convictions were illegal
because they constituted two punishments for the same offense in violation of
constitutional double jeopardy provisions. (Id.) Suttle's contention fails because
he cannot demonstrate a double jeopardy violation from the face of the record,
and because I.C.R. 35(a) did not permit the district court to revisit the factual
basis underlying the offense to determine whether Suttle was punished twice for
the same conduct.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law that is freely reviewed by

the court on appeal. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145
(2009).

C.

The District Court Properly Denied Suttle's I.C.R. 35 Motion To Correct An
Illegal Sentence
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. This clause protects
a defendant against multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. Schiro
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v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994); State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 622, 38
P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct. App. 2001).
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) allows the trial court to correct a sentence that
is "illegal from the face of the record at any time." Therefore, a double jeopardy
claim asserting that a court imposed multiple punishments for the same offense
may be raised in an I.C.R. 35(a) motion when the double jeopardy violation is
apparent from "the face of the record." State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837,841,
291 P.3d 1036, 1040 (2013).
However, it does not follow that any double jeopardy claim may be raised
in an I.C.R. 35(a) motion.

Where a double jeopardy challenge raised pursuant

to I.C.R. 35(a) requires a district court to revisit the factual basis underlying the
offense, relief is precluded by the language of I.C.R. 35(a). In Clements, 148
Idaho at 84-87, 218 P.3d at 1145-1148, the Idaho Supreme Court explained:
Therefore, the term "illegal sentence" under Rule 35 is
narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from the face of
the record, i.e., does not involve significant questions of fact or
require an evidentiary hearing. This interpretation is harmonious
with current Idaho law. As this Court recently noted in State v.
Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 735, 170 P.3d 397, 400 (2007), Rule 35 is
a "narrow rule." Because an illegal sentence may be corrected at
any time, the authority conferred by Rule 35 should be limited to
uphold the finality of judgments. Rule 35 is not a vehicle designed
to reexamine the facts underlying the case to determine whether a
sentence is illegal; rather, the rule only applies to a narrow category
of cases in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not
authorized by law or where new evidence tends to show that the
original sentence was excessive. See State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho
219, 223, 177 P.3d 966, 970 (2008).
In this case, as the district court correctly concluded, no double jeopardy
violation is apparent from the face of the record.

5

While misdemeanor battery is

a lesser included offense of attempted strangulation (and thus the "same
offense" for double jeopardy purposes, see Moffat 154 Idaho at 530-533, 300
P.3d at 62-65), the charging information in this case reflects that the state
charged Suttle with the two offenses for committing two different violent acts
against Ahmuty.

Suttle pied guilty to the following counts from the charging

information:
COUNT I
That the Defendant, PATRICK E. SUTTLE, on or about the
10th day of March, 2009, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did
willfully and unlawfully choke or attempt to strangle the person of
Michelle Ahmuty, to-wit: by putting his hands around Michelle
Ahmuty's neck and squeezing, and where Michelle Ahmuty and the
Defendant are household members or have or had a dating
relationship.
COUNT IV
That the Defendant, PATRICK E. SUTTLE, on or about the
10th day of March, 2009, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did
unlawfully and intentionally cause bodily harm, to-wit: by causing
bruising on Michelle Ahmuty's arms, face, and contusions to
Michelle Ahmuty's head.
(#40689 R., pp.33-35, 64-68.)
On appeal, Suttle cites Moffat, 154 Idaho at 532-533, 300 P.3d at 64-65,
for the general proposition that "[w]hen a person commits multiple acts against
the same victim during a single criminal episode and each act could
independently support a conviction for the same offense, for double jeopardy
purposes, the 'offense' is typically the episode, not each individual act."
(Appellant's brief, p.13.)

However, whether multiple acts constitute a "single

criminal episode" is a question of fact beyond the scope of I.C.R. 35(a).
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In State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 659, 330 P.3d 400, 405 (Ct. App 2014),
Moad asserted, on direct appeal, that his convictions for male rape and battery
with intent to commit a serious felony violated constitutional double jeopardy
provisions because the "acts occurred as parts of an indivisible course of
conduct and thus constitute a single criminal offense."

In affirming Mead's

conviction, the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized the general holding of Moffat
regarding double jeopardy and "single criminal episodes," but also noted:
However, the double jeopardy prohibition is not violated if
the charges are for distinct crimes rather than inseparable parts of
a single criminal episode. Therefore, if it appears that the double
jeopardy bar may be implicated, the court must make a factual
inquiry as to whether the crimes were parts of one continuing event
or transaction.

kL

(emphasis added).
Similarly, in this case, a determination of whether Suttle's attacks on his

girlfriend constituted a "single criminal episode" for double jeopardy purposes
would require a factual inquiry. In fact, on appeal, Suttle cites to a police report
attached to the PSI to support his argument that the attack constituted one
indivisible course of contact.

(Appellant's brief, pp.13-14 (citing #40689 PSI,

pp.2, 95).) While Moad and Moffat were permitted to make such arguments on
direct appeal, this is the type of "reexam[ination] [of] the facts underlying the
case" that is beyond the scope of I.C.R. 35(a). Clements, 148 Idaho at 84-87,
218 P.3d at 1145-1148.
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Suttle has failed to demonstrate a double jeopardy violation from the face
of the record.

This Court should therefore affirm the district court's denial of

Suttle's I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. 2

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
denying Suttle's I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence.
DATED this 15th day of April, 2015.

-'\-e

<

~-

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

Further, even assuming that it was apparent from the face of the record that the
district court's sentence violated constitutional double jeopardy provisions, Suttle
would not be entitled to his requested relief (Appellant's brief, p.14), that this
Court vacate his felony attempted strangulation conviction. Instead, where a
defendant is convicted of both a greater offense and a lesser included offense for
the same criminal conduct, the lesser included offense is merged into the greater
offense. See State v. Eby, 136 Idaho 534, 540, 37 P.3d 625, 631 (Ct. App.
2001); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 210-211, 731 P.2d 192, 205-206 (1986);
State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 756-758, 810 P.2d 680, 694-696 (1991),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 432, 825 P.2d 1081,
1088 (1991).
2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 15ht day of April, 2015, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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